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FLORIDA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SHIELD: AN EXPRESS
RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE BY GOVERNMENT AND THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
SCOTT DENSON*

Right of Privacy.-Every natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life
except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be
construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and

meetings as provided by law.'

1.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE United States Constitution includes piecemeal protections of
individual civil liberties. The government cannot search our
homes without cause, 2 cannot prevent us from bearing arms,3 cannot
silence political speech, 4 and cannot interrogate accused criminals
without providing access to advice by counsel.' The Constitution,
however, weaves no mystic web about our private selves. As long as
the government observes the fragmented protections guaranteed by
the Constitution, both the government and the private sector may invade private areas unprotected by state law.
The limited nature of the constitutional right to privacy was succinctly described in Katz v. United States.6 In Katz the Federal Bureau

of Investigation eavesdropped on a private telephone conversation by
connecting electronic devices to the outside of a public telephone
booth used by a man suspected of illegal gambling. 7 Katz argued that
the government intruded upon his right to privacy and committed a
* The author thanks Warren Husband, whose insight was instrumental in completing the
skeletal framework of this Comment; Nancy Jack, whose emphasis on correct and detailed supporting documentation added greater sinew and muscle to that framework; and Kim Stott,
whose insistence on clarity helped bring color to its cheeks.
1. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See id. amend. II.
4. See id. amend. I.
5. See id. amend. VI.
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Id. at 348.
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search and seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment.' The government countered that a public telephone booth was not a constitutionally protected area. 9 It also claimed, in the alternative, that even if
Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy within the four walls of

the closed booth, the government never invaded this area. 0
Katz clarified earlier decisions that may have indicated the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment were only to be asserted
within certain places." The Court explained that the Constitution protected people, not places," and that its reach extended to any activity

reasonably intended to be undertaken in private. 3 The Court, however, refused to recognize a constitutionally protected general right of
privacy.' 4 Such a general right of privacy, wrote Justice Stewart, was
protected by state, not federal, law.'"
Thus, Katz recognized the states' authority to protect their citizens'
general right of privacy. The Florida Supreme Court accepted that authority in State v. Sarmiento,'6 where the police wiretapped an undercover narcotics officer's conversation in a suspect's home. The court
held that although Sarmiento discussed the sale of heroin with the undercover officer, the officer had no right to electronically transmit the

conversation to associates outside the suspect's home without a warrant. 17

8
Although the transmission did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
the court found it was prohibited by article I, section 12 of the Florida

8. Id. at 349-50.
9. Id. at 351. Traditionally, the Court considered certain areas, such as the home, so intimately personal that they should be constitutionally protected. Id. at 351 n.8 (citing Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). Other areas, such as an open field, were deemed too public
to prevent warrantless entry by authorities. Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924)).
10. Id. at 351.
11. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) ("[Al decision [that
intrusion of a 'spike mike' into a heating duct in Silverman's home violated the Fourth Amendment] is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.");
see also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439-40 (1963) (Fourth Amendment did not bar
law enforcement agent from taping conversation in Lopez's office where the agent entered with
Lopez's permission and the tape was made solely to corroborate the agent's testimony at trial).
The Court in Katz cited to Silverman and Lopez and stated that "[it is true that this Court
has occasionally described its conclusions in terms of 'constitutionally protected areas,' . . . but
we have never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth
Amendment problem." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
12. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
13. Id. at 351-52.
14. Id. at 350-51.
15. Id.
16. 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981).
17. Id. at 644-45.
18. See id. at 646 (Alderman, J., dissenting).

19931

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Constitution, 9 which guaranteed "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against . ..the un20
reasonable interception of private communications by any means."
The court reasoned that every person has a reasonable expectation of
private communication within his or her home. 2 Even if the United
States Constitution did not prevent interception of such communications, the people of Florida had assured additional protection through
their state constitution. 22 Moreover, the court deemed it "[a] fundamental task of the judiciary" to preserve the rights so created.23
Thus, Sarmiento accepted the authority offered by Katz. If the general right to privacy must be shielded by the individual states, Sarmiento established that Florida's courts will protect any such rights
constitutionally created by its citizens. However, for reasons not
stated in its analysis of Sarmiento, the court based its decision solely
on the privacy protections afforded by the search-and-seizure provision of the Florida Constitution despite the adoption of the privacy
amendment by Florida's voters on November 4, 1980.24
Since the adoption of the privacy amendment to the FloridaConstitution, the state's district courts of appeal have addressed its provisions in more than fifty cases. 2 Beginning with Florida Board of Bar
Examiners Re: Applicant 26 the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly
construed the meaning and extent of the state privacy right, 27 showing

19. Id. at 644 (citing FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12).
20. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. Note, however, that Sarmiento preceded the November 1982
adoption of the conformity amendment to article I, § 12 of the Florida Constitution. This
amendment, which became effective on January 3, 1983, provides that "[tjhe right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects ... against the unreasonable interception of private communications ... shall be construed in conformity with the 4th amendment to
the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." State v.
Hume, 512 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1987).
21. State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Article I, § 23 was adopted by public referendum on November 4, 1980. The final vote
was 1,722,980 in favor, 1,120,302 opposed. Gerald B. Cope, Jr., A Quick Look at Florida's
New Right of Privacy,FLA. B.J., Jan. 1981, at 12, 14 n.3 [hereinafter "Cope, Privacy"].
25. See, e.g., Parnell v. St. Johns County, 603 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); State v.
Brewster, 601 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Doe v. State, 587 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA
1991); Forrester v. State, 565 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
26. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
27. Cases essential to understanding the state right to privacy and the elements of a successful claim under article I, § 23 include Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1572 (1992); Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 288
(1991); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186
(Fla. 1989); Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); Rasmussen
v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel
Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452
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attorneys how to measure and frame viable claims. However, although the courts have provided ample material, no commentator has
yet outlined a framework to guide the analysis of privacy claims. 8 In
fact, commentators have largely ignored both the need for the framework and the landmark cases that would make its construction possiSo. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71; Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980),
adopting 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (holding before the adoption of article 1, § 23 that
a competent patient had the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment).
28. One commentator has listed four approaches to constitutional analyses:
1. The Primacy Method: State ConstitutionalAnalysis First, Supplemented by Federal
The primacy approach looks to the state constitution first, treating the federal Constitution as supplemental filler.
2.

The Independent Method: Simultaneous Evaluation of State and FederalConstitutions
The independent method of constitutional analysis calls for evaluation of both state
and federal provisions to determine protection afforded under each even if analysis at
one level is dispositive of the issue ....
3. The InterstitialMethod: Federal ConstitutionalAnalysis First, Supplemented by
State
The interstitial approach mirrors the primacy approach, looking to the federal Constitution first and treating the state constitution as supplemental. If the federal Constitution is dispositive, then state constitutional analysis is not triggered.
4. The Lockstep Method: State Constitutionsat the Vanishing Point
The lockstep approach calls for adoption of the federal standard when there are analogous federal and state constitutional provisions.
Michael J. Mello, The Jurisdiction To Do Justice: Florida'sJury Override and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 923, 946-49 (1991).
Mello argues that the Florida Supreme Court uses the primacy approach in article I, § 23 cases
involving abortion, the interstitial approach in right-to-die cases and a primacy approach influenced by a lockstep mandate for search-and-seizure claims in disclosure cases. Id. at 960-61.
Mello's guidelines for constitutional analysis are useful in determining how state courts will apply article I, § 23 to various facts. He cites Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541
So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989), as an example of the interstitial interpretation in a right-to-die case. Id. at
961 n.188. However, Wons is analyzed using Florida common law rather than federal constitutional law. Generally, the supreme court has used the primacy approach in other right-to-die
cases. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (applying Florida common
law to interpret the "fundamental right of privacy ... expressly enumerated in article I, section
23 of the Florida Constitution").
Florida courts also apply a primacy analysis to disclosural cases-those involving the right to
withhold private information-because article I, § 23 protects only "except as otherwise provided herein" and article I, § 12 requires search and seizure in strict conformance with the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See also Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood
Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987) (analyzing disclosure case under state's "strong,
freestanding right of privacy . . . [protecting] those privacy interests inherent in the concept of
liberty which may not otherwise be protected by specific constitutional provisions").
We may accept Mello's thesis that the outcome of a case may partly be forecast by deciding
what law will be applied. Mello, supra, at 942-61. However, it is still uncertain what varying
standards of review will be applied to the privacy amendment cases, what tests will be applied
under those standards, what facts will raise a colorable claim, and what ends will be pursued by
the courts.
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ble. These failures, coupled with the broad protection promised by
what this author considers the provision's facial ambiguity and the
high standard of review imposed by the supreme court,2 9 have led to a
burgeoning caseload of privacy claims.30
On another front, Florida's privacy provision has been read only to
protect against governmental intrusion into personal privacy. 3' This
interpretation, following early textual analyses developed before Florida's first construction of the provision, is contradicted by widespread
judicial dicta and analyses indicating the law perhaps could be extended to prohibit certain invasions by the private sector. 2 The interpretation also conflicts with any reasonable application of the
33
traditional tools used to construe the FloridaConstitution.
This Comment has two purposes. First, I will argue that the privacy
amendment adopted by the voters as article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution provides an express right of privacy against intrusions by the private sector. Second, I will analyze the right to privacy,
describing both its elements and the standard of review courts apply
to intrusive actions. However, because no case involving private sector
intrusion has been decided, I will analyze the right to privacy by construing the law in light of relevant cases involving the public sector.
II.

THE PRIVACY AMENDMENT:

A

SEARCH FOR ITS PROPER SCOPE

Laws are typically created by the Legislature, then construed by the
judiciary and evaluated by the critics. Constitutional amendments,
however, may take a different course. After the privacy amendment
was proposed by the Constitution Revision Commission, a4 it was ana-

29. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985)
("The right of privacy ..
demands the compelling state interest standard"). The scope of this
standard, however, is limited to public sector cases.
30. Article I, § 23 is cited in 71 appellate decisions, approximately one-third of which have
been reported since March 31, 1989. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 25.
31. See, e.g., Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Sirmons, 508 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1987); Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
32. See, e.g., Forsberg v. Housing Auth. of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 375 (Fla. 1984)
(Overton, J., concurring) ("Because the proper parties and facts are not before this Court, I
would not address the issue of whether a civil action for invasion of privacy could be maintained
against persons who use personal, intimate information . . . for strictly private purposes totally
unconnected with governmental accountability, but would recognize that this could be a justiciable issue in a future proceeding"); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 688
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (quoting above language in Forsberg). See also infra notes 87, 108-27, and
accompanying text.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 88-99 for a discussion of the methods used to construe the constitution.
34. Generally, article XI, § I requires that the Legislature propose the constitutional
amendment. However, in 1968, article XI, § 2 was added to create a Constitution Revision Coin-
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lyzed by the critics" before the public adopted it by referendum. Only
then was it judicially construed. Consequently, the courts could consider three elements in divining the scope of the new provision. The
effects of each of these-the framers' intent, persuasive critical analysis, and the will of the adopters-will be considered separately.
A.

The Intent Underlying the ProposedPrivacyAmendment

The history of Florida's constitutional privacy provision has been
fully analyzed elsewhere. 36 The purpose of this section is instead to
glean from those analyses guidance to the intent behind the Commission's efforts and the public policy and other secondary concerns that
may have limited the framers' efforts.
Article I, section 23 developed in three stages. First, at the opening
meeting of the Constitution Revision Commission, Ben F. Overton, a
commissioner and then-Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
described the need for a constitutional provision protecting individual
privacy against governmental and private intrusion." In opening remarks quoted repeatedly in court decisions construing the intent of
the amendment, Justice Overton declared:
Because government in its operation does affect more citizens, the
task of this Commission to review our basic constitutional document
is even more critical to ensure constitutional protection of individual
rights.
And who, ten years ago, really understood that personal and
financial data on a substantial part of our population could be
collected by government or business .. .? There is public concern
about how personal information concerning an individual citizen is
used, whether it be collected by government or by business. The
subject of individual privacy and privacy law is in a developing
stage ....It is a new problem that should be addressed. 8
Second, the Commission held meetings across the state seeking citizen input, then referred the matter to its own Ethics, Privacy, and

mission. It provided that recommendations from the Commission be submitted directly to the
Secretary of State. Patricia A. Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 609, 611
n.9 (1978) (citing Sandy D'Alemberte, Commentary, in 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. 548 (West 1970)).
35. See Gerald B. Cope, Jr., To Be Let Alone: Florida's ProposedRight of Privacy, 6 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 673, 721-36 (1978) [hereinafter "Cope (1978)"]; Dore, supra note 34, at 650-57.
36. See Cope (1978), supra note 35; Dore, supranote 34.
37. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 722 (quoting then-Chief Justice Ben Overton, Address to
the Constitution Revision Commission (July 6, 1977)).
38. Id. at 721-22. Overton's remarks have been quoted in, for example, Rasmussen v.
South Florida Blood Service, Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987).
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Elections Committee. 9 This Committee was responsible for determining whether Justice Overton's recommended constitutional provision
should be proposed, and if so, how it should be formulated." ° The
Committee quickly decided that the right to privacy deserved constitutional status.4 ' The members determined that the right was fundamental and that acts affecting individual privacy should meet the highest
possible standard of review. 42 The Committee, however, believed the
compelling state interest standard was too weak. 4 3 Consequently, the
Committee refused to include an express standard of review in the
proposed text, deciding instead to express the right in absolute terms
prohibiting all government intrusion into private life."
The major substantive issue confronting the Committee was
whether the provision would protect individuals against private intrusion. 45 As Justice Overton's remarks suggest, the right to be free from
private interference seems inherent in the right to be let alone."6 The
Committee initially approved, in principle, a right protecting against
either public or private intrusion.4 7 The members ultimately concluded, however, that such a right could improperly curtail the media's power to collect information. 48 After consideration, the
Committee submitted to the Commission Proposal 132, which stated
that: "(a) Every individual has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life. (b) The legislature shall
protect by law the private lives of the people from intrusion by other
persons." 49
Third, the Commission considered the proposal.5 0 The Committee
had sought to create a self-executing right of privacy against the government and a non-self-executing order for the Legislature to prevent
intrusion by the private sector." The Commission disagreed, however,
because the Legislature already could protect individual privacy inter-

39.

Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 723; Dore, supra note 34, at 650.

40.

See Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 723-24.

41. Id. at 724.
42. Id. at 724-25.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 725.
Dore, supra note 34, at 652-55.
See Cope (1978), supranote 35, at 725 -27.
See Cope (1978), supranote 35, at 722 (quoting Justice Overton, supra note 37) ("There

is public concern about how personal information concerning an individual citizen is used,
whether it be collected by government or by business.") (emphasis added).
47. Dore, supra note 34, at 650.
48. Id. at 651.
49. Id. at 651 n.257.
50. Id. at 651.
51. Commissioner Moyle argued this position to the Commission. See Cope (1978), supra
note 35, at 731.
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ests against 3private intrusion.5 2 The Commission therefore deleted sub5
section (b).
Even on the surface, the Commission's reasoning appears suspect.
The Legislature's power to enact laws protecting against private invasions of privacy gives no assurance that it will pass such laws. In the

twelve years since the Commission's proceedings, the Legislature has
not yet enacted the protection from private invasion that article I, sec54
tion 23 affords against intrusion by the state.
Consequently, the history of the privacy amendment indicates ambivalence, not toward the idea of a general right of privacy against all
comers, but toward the idea of a constitutional amendment as the best
means of protecting that right. However, because the Commission

recognized the Legislature's power to protect the privacy right from
intrusions by the private sector, one can correctly rely on the framers'
intent as a basis for restricting the scope of the privacy amendment to
governmental intrusion."

52. Dore, supra note 34, at 651:
While genuine concern was expressed about invasions of personal privacy by private
individuals and organizations, the commission seemed to feel that the legislature
would address those problems without a constitutional directive. The vagueness of the
language, the worry about increasing governmental regulation of private enterprise,
and the possibility of judicial constructions resulting in unforeseen consequences resulted in the commission's refusal to go along with the committee proposal as it related to the private sector.
(citations omitted); see also Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 736 nn.379-80 and accompanying
text.
53. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 736. In addition, critics generally point out that the
privacy amendment was intended to protect only against governmental action, although they
agree that the Committee wanted to protect against both public and private sector intrusion. See
infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text; see also Dore, supra note 34, at 650-51.
54. The Legislature has offered limited protection of the right to be let alone. Currently,
Floridians are protected against stalkers who "wilfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [follow] or
harrass" them, FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (Supp. 1992); harassing or obscene telephone calls, id. §
365.16 (1991); and unwanted solicitation of goods or services. Id. §§ 470.026(3), 497.03. Protection of the disclosural privacy interests of the general public is limited to chapter 934, Florida
Statutes, which prohibits unauthorized interception of wire, electronic, and oral communications.
Other laws preventing private sector intrusion are mainly intended for protected or "special"
classes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 228.093 (1991) (student records); id. § 381.004, 384.25, 384.29(1),
392.25, 392.53 (Supp. 1992) (records of patients testing positive for tuberculosis or human immunodeficiency virus); id. § 393.13 (persons with developmental disabilities); id. § 394.459(9)
(mentally ill); id. § 400.401(2) (Supp. 1992) (elderly and disabled residents of adult living centers); id. § 400.609(2) (Supp. 1992) (hospice-care patients); id. § 413.012 (blind persons); id. §
651.083 (nursing home patients); id. §§ 744.3215, 744.708(l),(2) (incapacitated persons); id. ch.
943, 958.13(2) (requiring criminal and law enforcement records to be collected and disseminated
with "due regard to the privacy interests of individuals").
55. Notably, a similarly worded proposed constitutional revision was defeated in 1978.
Cope, Privacy, supra note 24, at 12. However, the privacy proposal offered that year was part of
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B.

The CriticalFramework-EarlyGuidelinesfor Judicial
Construction

The earliest critical analyses of Florida's privacy provision actually
preceded the adoption of the amendment. A seminal Note 6 and its
sequel Article,5 7 both written by Gerald B. Cope, Jr., 58 are typically
the only amendment-based studies cited by the Florida Supreme Court
in its privacy decisions.5 9 Cope's Note traces the development of the
federal and Florida rights of privacy and analyzes constitutional models open to states seeking to protect privacy.60 Among other recommendations, Cope urged a "free-standing

right of privacy ...

to

protect against governmental intrusion." 6' He also recommended that
the courts and Legislature be given the power to protect individuals
against "intrusions by the private sector."

62

Following publication of Cope's Note, his remarks before the Commission on the need for a state privacy provision, 63 and Justice Overton's urging at those hearings, 64 the Commission approved the
wording ultimately adopted as article I, section 23: "Right of privacy.-Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by
65
law.'
Shortly after the Commission's action, Cope wrote his second study
of Florida's privacy right.6 The Article's analytical core is a brief,
the 1978 omnibus revision of the Florida Constitution which required voters to accept or reject a
package of about 50 amendments. Id. See also Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633, 641 (England, C.J., dissenting). Consequently, its defeat should not
be viewed as a rejection of a greater protection of privacy interests. See id.
56. Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 631 (1977) [hereinafter "Cope (1977)"].
57. Cope (1978), supra note 35.
58. Currently a judge on Florida's Third District Court of Appeal, Cope, graduated with
high honors from The Florida State University College of Law in 1977. Judge Cope practiced
law in Miami with Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson & Greer before rising to the bench in 1988.
59. See Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 265 (Fla. 1990); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568
So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989); Rasmussen v. South Fla.
Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 n.4 (Fla. 1987).
60. Cope (1977), supra note 56, at 732-42.
61. Id. at 742.
62. Id.
63. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 673.
64. See Dore, supra note 34, at 650.
65. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. See Dore, supra note 34, at 651-57 for a history of the proposals considered by the Commission. These proposals are more fully discussed supra text accompanying notes 36-55.
66. See generally Cope (1978), supra note 35.
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straightforward textual analysis of the proposed article I, section 23.67
Significantly, Cope's analysis parallels the rationale used by the Florida Supreme Court in subsequent decisions.
Cope argues that Florida proposed a "general" right that neither
engulfed nor eroded other constitutional rights, yet which was embodied in "a separate free-standing constitutional section which declares a

fundamental right."" He then analyzes the proposed section phraseby-phrase. He writes that the phrase "every natural person" restricts
the privacy right to individuals, 69 protecting neither the activities nor
information of business organizations, private associations, or gov-

ernment agencies.70 He describes Florida's "right to be let alone,"

which he equates with a "right of privacy, ' "' as a blanket immunity
for all individuals subject to the three restrictions explicitly imposed

by the text's language: "and free from governmental intrusion,"
'72
"into his private life," and "except as otherwise provided herein."

Cope reads the clause "and free from governmental intrusion" to
limit the amendment's protection to state interference. 7 The modifier
"into his private life" indicates that the right extends only to private
matters, not those involving second parties (e.g., business transactions) where the individual surrenders the right to a reasonable expectation of privacy.7 4 The phrase "except as otherwise provided herein"
75
subordinates the right to other constitutional grants of state power.
67. Id. at 740-44.
68. Id. at 740. The framers of the provision, see supra note 42 and accompanying text, and
the Florida Supreme Court agreed that the right of privacy was a fundamental right. See, e.g.,
Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985). Considering the
universal agreement about its importance, it seems incongruent that this "right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," id. at 546 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting)), should be
limited to freedom from state oppression alone.
69. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 741.
70. Id. at 742.
71. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 741 n.408. Florida has generally followed this equation,
using the two terms interchangeably. But see Cope (1977), supra note 56, at 688-89 (privacy in
contemporary jurisprudence is protected as it corresponds with liberty interests); Stall v. State,
570 So. 2d 257, 266-67 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting) (brief history of development of right
to privacy in federal and Florida law, noting, inter alia, that right to be let alone encompasses
the right to self-autonomy and the right to a zone of physical and psychological secrecy). Thus,
the provision protects both the right to self-autonomy, see, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (right to refuse medical treatment); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186
(Fla. 1989) (right of minor to terminate pregnancy), and the right to keep personal matters from
others. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
72. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 742-44.
73. Id. at 742.
74. Id. at 742-43.
75. Id. at 742; see, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (search and seizure); id. § 24 (requiring
public records and open meetings of state employees); id. art. II, § 8 (ability to require financial
disclosure).
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Finally, Cope's analysis focuses on the first issue to be decided by the
Florida courts: the standard of review when construing article I, section 23.76 Reasoning that the few available Florida constitutional privacy cases "point to the compelling interest standard," Cope wrote
that the article I, section 23 right of privacy "should elicit the same
level of scrutiny as . . .other fundamental rights." 77 Consequently, he
state interest stanrecommended that Florida apply the compelling
78
claims.
privacy
23
section
I,
article
to
dard
Cope's paradigm for Florida privacy analysis, and the major issues
it outlines, may be better explained by comparison to a Note published some three years later. In 1981 Joseph S. Jackson wrote a second textual analysis of article I, section 23.1 The Note's centerpiece is
a phrase-by-phrase textual analysis modeled largely on that of its
predecessor. 0

Cope and Jackson agree that article I, section 23's promise of a
"right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion" protects
individuals only against state intrusion.8" Cope rests his conclusion on
both textual analysis8 2 and the drafters' intent to leave to the Legisla83
ture the duty of protecting against intrusions by the private sector.
However, Jackson's opinion, which is based on an expansion of

76. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 744-50.
77. Id. at 748 (citing Hagaman v. Andrews, 232 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1970); Byron, Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978),
quashed and remanded, 379 So. 2d 633, 639 (Fla. 1980)). Both cases were decided before the
privacy provision was adopted.
78. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 750. The Florida Supreme Court later adopted the compelling state interest standard requiring "heightened review"-proof of a compelling state interest pursued by the least intrusive means. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.
2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
79. Joseph S. Jackson, Note, Interpreting Florida'sNew ConstitutionalRight of Privacy,
33 U. FLA. L. Rav. 565 (1981). Jackson is cited in Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 267 (Fla. 1990)
(Kogan, J., dissenting), for the proposition that Florida's privacy right protects both actions
taken in seclusion and those within "a certain sphere of personal autonomy that is beyond the
scope of any governmental interference whatsoever, whether 'secluded' or not."
Jackson's theory broadens the range of self-autonomy protected in In re Guardianship of
Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re T. W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); and other cases
involving activities the control of which are essential to liberty. See, e.g.,
Browning, 568 So. 2d
at 10; Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987). These cases include
activities less intensely personal than the right to refuse medical treatment or to obtain an abortion. Such an expansion would confront the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test's touchstone of seclusion, to which the court has adhered in disclosure cases. See, e.g., Winfield, 477
So. 2d at 547.
80. Jackson, supra note 79, at 571-80.
81. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 742; Jackson, supra note 79, at 575-76.
82. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 742 n.413 ("nonsensical" to read "right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion" as two correlative rights "to be let alone" and "to be
free from governmental intrusion.").
83. Id. at 726-28, 731-35.
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Cope's textual analysis, s4 is potentially misleading and logically
flawed.
Notably, Jackson states that:
A persuasive argument has been made that as used in the new
provision, "and" does not mean "as well as" but rather operates in
conjunction with the words that follow to limit the preceding broad
right. Two reasons support this construction. First, the text speaks of
a single right, not a group of rights. If "and" were given its normal
meaning a duplicity of rights would be created: the right to be left
alone and the right to be free from governmental intrusion into one's
private life. Second, this reading of "and" would render the
succeeding words surplusage .... Conversely, "the right to be let
alone" is not rendered meaningless by the limitation imposed by the
succeeding text.
The general import of the term "governmental" is relatively clear,
given the foregoing conclusion that it operates to limit the protection
of the right to be let alone. It establishes that the new provision
curtails only state, and not private, interference with one's right to
be let alone. 5
Jackson refuses to give "and" its "normal meaning" to avoid implying two rights: the right to be let alone and the right to be free
from governmental intrusion into one's private life. In fact, a "normal" reading of the language would allow the provision to assert the
right to be let alone in one's private life against all comers while simultaneously protecting against intrusion into private data by government. Such a reading would not constitutionally interfere with
commercial data collection, but would protect the general right to privacy by mandating judicial or legislative action as required to enforce
that right.
Article I, section 23 states that "[elvery naturalpersonhas the right
to be let alone andfree from governmental intrusion into his private
life." The ambiguous text, insofar as it appears to yield a "plain
meaning," does not agree with the Cope/Jackson interpretation. Regardless of its actual intent, the Commission appears to have effectively drafted a provision recognizing a right to be let alone by all
others, a right which included protection from governmental intrusion
into private affairs.
Both Cope and Jackson, of course, focused on the framers' intent
in their interpretations, ignoring other traditional tools of constitu-

84.
85.

Jackson, supra note 79, at 575.
Id. at 577-78.
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tional construction. 6 Moreover, neither author had our present advantage of broad-based judicial construction; an advantage which, as
will be shown, reveals that courts have provided persuasive language
23 can be read to protect against intruon whether article I, section
7
sion by the private sector.1
C.

The Intent of the People: The Forgotten Element in Analyzing

the PrivacyAmendment
Florida's courts, like Cope and Jackson, have construed the privacy
provision in keeping with the drafters' intent to limit the scope of the
amendment to governmental intrusion.88 This technique, however,
fails to use "well settled" tools of constitutional construction. 9 As the
Florida Supreme Court explained: "In construing provisions of the
constitution, each provision must be given effect, according to its
plain and ordinary meaning. The court must give provisions a reasonable meaning, tending to fulfill, not frustrate, the intent of the framers and adopters. Constructions which are strained . . . must be

86. Both Cope's Note and Article were written before the 1980 adoption of the provision.
Therefore, he could not be expected to consider public opinion in analyzing the proposal. Jackson's 1981 Note, on the other hand, simply failed to consider this central factor.
87. No court has yet construed article I, § 23 to specifically include or exclude protection
against private sector intrusion. The First District Court of Appeal has construed the privacy
amendment to preclude governmental intrusion. See Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Sirmons, 508 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The Third District Court of Appeal has struggled to allow claims where no clear state intrusion has occurred. See Rasmussen v. South Fla.
Blood Serv., 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (finding in court-compelled discovery an adequate nexus to meet the state action requirement so as to prevent private sector intrusion). The
Second District Court of Appeal has indicated that article I, § 23 might also prohibit private
actions. See, e.g., Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328, 329-30 (Fla.
2d DCA 1983) (court's language indicated the privacy amendment could, in some circumstances,
be applied against a privately-owned business, such as the television station in Doe).
The Florida Supreme Court, in Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1989), gave the
privacy provision expansive reach:
This right ensures that individuals are able "to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others." A.
WESTON, Privacy & Freedom (1967); see also T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of
Expression 548 (1970) (arguing that "the main thrust of any realistic system for the
protection of privacy" must be the prevention of outside persons from obtaining information about individuals seeking privacy'). One of its ultimate goals is to foster
[the freedom] . .. which can thrive only by assuring a zone of privacy into which not
even government may intrude without invitation or consent.
(emphasis added). See also infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
1985) ("We believe that the amendment should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
drafters.").
89. See Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960) (constitutional amendments must be
construed to "fulfill the intent of the people").
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avoided." 9 The court, therefore, must fulfill the intent of both the
framers and the adopters. However, where those intents differ, the
voters' will must rule because "[tihe fundamental object to be sought
in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of the
framers ...in such a manner as to fulfill, the intent of the people,
never to defeat it."' 91 In cases where the provision is drafted by public
committee, the drafters' intent will be given great weight, 92 but should
always be outweighed by the probable intent of the voters.93
Thus, the overriding question should be whether the voters understood the right of privacy embodied in article I, section 23 to protect
them from private sector intrusion. That understanding may be ascertained from the "plain meaning" of the text,9 explained by reference
to popular dictionaries, 9 the historical record,9 or common sense. 97
After the privacy amendment was adopted, Cope reiterated that the
provision protected only against government intrusion, this time referring to the "plain language" approved by the voters:
Florida citizens have [declared] that privacy is an important right,
deserving of recognition and protection.
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE

A phrase-by-phrase analysis of the privacy section indicates its
major features:
"Right of Privacy-Every naturalperson has the right to be let
alone".... The basic declaration that each person has the right to
be let alone is limited, and explained, by the remainder of the
section.
"and free from governmental intrusion"-The right of privacy
protects against government activity but not against intrusions by
private individuals or businesses. 9

90.

In re Advisory Opinion to the Gov., 374 So. 2d 959, 964 (Fla. 1979); see also Williams

v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1978) (same language regarding the construction of article II,

§ 8(d) of the Sunshine Amendment).
91. Gray, 125 So. 2d at 852.
92. Williams, 360 So. 2d at 420 n.5.
93. See, e.g.,
Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 930 (Fla. 1978) (interpreting the voters'
perception of language in Florida's Administrative Procedure Act (APA) where the Governor
submitted the APA to the voters for adoption).
94.
95.

See Williams, 360 So. 2d at 419.
See, e.g., Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 67 (Fla. 1990)

(ascertaining the intent of the framers of a constitutional provision by reference to OXFORD ENoLISit DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)); Myers, 362 So. 2d

at 930 (ascertaining the voters' intended understanding of the terms "judicial tribunal" in the
APA by reference to WEBSTER's TnIR

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTiONARY (1971)).

96. See, e.g., Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 856 (Fla. 1960).
97. In re Advisory Opinion to the Gov., 374 So. 2d 959, 964 (Fla. 1979).
98.

Cope, Privacy, supra note 24, at 12.
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The provision clearly offers the meaning suggested by Cope only when
annotated. Without critical comment, it is unlikely that the voters
would understand that the "basic declaration . . [of] the right to be
let alone" is limited, rather than expanded, by the addition of a right
to be free from governmental intrusion. In seeking the will of the
adopting voters, we should first seek the most reasonable interpretation of the text standing alone.9 Such a reading could appear to
promise a bipartite right: the general right to be let alone by all and to
be free from governmental intrusion into one's private life.
The historical record provides some guidance. In the weeks before
the 1980 election, Florida's major newspapers were primarily concerned with the presidential contest and the fate of the hostages in
Iran.100 Issues published after the proposal's adoption do reveal that
the amendment had been a matter of some debate.'01 However, that
debate basically disregarded the question of whether the amendment
would provide a general or limited right of privacy. Rather, the major
concerns appear to have been that police investigation might be inhibited and that homosexuals might gain freedom from government intrusion into their private lives. 102 Yet, although there appears to have
been a media consensus that the amendment was generally intended to
protect against state intrusion, 03 only the Miami Herald and the Florida Times-Union expressed such an opinion in the days before its November 4 adoption.' 4
On election day, the newspapers reminded the voters that they
would decide on a "constitutional right of privacy."0 5 The sample

99. See Advisory Opinion, 374 So. 2d at 964 ("The Court must give provisions a reasonable
meaning.").
100. The headlines included Saul Friedman & Remer Tyson, Two Days Left and Odds Say
It's Reagan, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 2, 1980, at Al; Iranian:Release a Problem of Time,
TAMPA TIrE., Nov. 1, 1980, at Al; Bill King, 10,000 Greet Carter at Lakeland Rally, TAMPA
Tam., Nov. 1, 1980, at A l; James McCartney, Iran Sets Terms for Release, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 3, 1980, at Al; Hedrick Smith, 50-State Survey Reflects Reagan Surge, FLA. TIMESUNION & J., Nov. 2, 1980, at Al.
101. See Rick Barry, 4 Out of 5 Amendments on the Road to Passing, TAMPA TRI., Nov. 5,
1980, at IB; Larry Lipman, Voters To Decide Privacy Issue, ORLANDO SENTINEL STAR, Nov. 5,
1980 at 9E; Peter McMahon, Amendments: Right to Privacy, 3 Other Constitutional Changes
Okayed By Voters, ST. PETERSBUR TIMS, Nov. 5, 1980 at 5B.
102. See articles cited supranote 101.
103. See, e.g., R. Michael Anderson, What the Amendments Will Do, FLA. TIMES-UNION &
J.,Nov. 2, 1980, at Cl I; Barry, supra note 100; Orval Jackson, Privacy Issue Faces Newlyaffirmed State Justices, TA.LAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 5, 1980, at 2B.
104. See Anderson, supra note 103; Craig Matsuda, State Questions Are a Mix of Roads,
Water, Privacy, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 2, 1980, at B4.
105. Jack Greene, 78% Turnout Expected ForElection, TAMPA TrIB., Nov. 4, 1980, at IA;
Races, Issues, TALLAIASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 4, 1980, at 2B ("[Amendment] No. 2-Would establish constitutional right to privacy").
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ballots provided by county supervisors of elections were no more informative, stating merely that article I, section 23 would establish a
"constitutional right of privacy."' These samples were identical to
the ballots provided at the voting booths. Because the ballots were
silent on governmental intrusion, and in fact never set forth the text
of the provision, most voters probably never considered whether the
promise of a general right of privacy was restricted in any way.
The text of the privacy provision seems to facially promise the general right to be let alone, accompanied by the right to escape government intrusion into personal matters. This common sense reading,
while it protects the person from all comers, protects private information only from state intrusion. Thus, it permits business and individuals to seek such information so long as they do not invade personal
privacy. Such a reading comports with the Commission's concern
that-although individual rights were to be protected-business interests in the collection of essential data were not to be thwarted.ec
Those voters familiar with the proposal's wording would find in the
newspapers' and ballot's description of a "constitutional right to privacy" confirmation of their "normal" reading. Those confused by its
ambiguity would find in the wording of the ballot a simple explanation. Consequently, the public record from the period surrounding the
election provides only sketchy evidence that the public was aware that
they would gain only the right to be let alone by the state.
D.

Misreading the Framers' Intent To Make It Conform to the
Demands of Public Policy Considerations

The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that constitutional provisions first must be interpreted according to their plain
meaning to ascertain the adopting public's intent. 08 The framers' intent will be followed only when it does not contradict that of the voters.109 It is therefore surprising that Florida courts have followed Cope
and other early authors in construing the privacy amendment solely as
its framers intended." 0 Even more surprising, the high court has misread that intent to effectively find in the amendment an attempt to
protect against intrusion from any source.

106. See, e.g., Robin C. Krivanek, Supervisor of Elections, Hillsborough County, Sample
Ballot, TAMPA Tia., Nov. 4, 1980, at 4A; Wilma S. Sullivan, Supervisor of Elections, Leon
County, Sample Ballot, TALLAHASSEa DEMOCRAT, Nov. 2, 1980, at 6A.
107.
108.
109.
110.
1985).

See supratext accompanying note 48; see also Dore, supra note 34, at 650-51.
See supranotes 90-93 and accompanying text.
Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851-52 (Fla. 1960).
See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
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Rasmussen v. South FloridaBlood Service, Inc."' provides instructive insight into the court's reading of the intent of the provision. The
decision quotes Justice Overton's remarks on the concerns of citizens
about the collection of private information "whether

. .

. by govern-

ment or by business."" 2 From this, the court concludes: "Thus, a
principal aim of the constitutional provision is to afford individuals
some protection against the increasing collection, retention, and use
of information relating to all facets of an individual's life."" 3 In Rasmussen the court chooses Justice Overton's remarks as a proper summary of the framers' intent," 4 even though those remarks were made
at the opening of the Commission's hearings. After the address, the
Ethics, Privacy, and Elections Committee declined to include an express self-executing right against private invasion within the amendment's language, opting instead for an instruction to the
Legislature." 5 Subsequently, the Commission rejected even that provision. 16 Thus, the supreme court's choice of Justice Overton's remarks
concerning a general right of privacy against even private invaders reflects a choice to address three policy concerns.
First, the right to be let alone-deemed fundamental by both
federal" 7 and state" 8 courts-cannot be interpreted as the right to be
free from government intrusion alone. Second, the state must be
barred from improper action whether acting on its own motivation or
as the agent" 9 or servant 20 of a private entity. Third, Justice Overton's remarks provided an entry by which the court could fulfill the
authority recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Katz v.
United States:'2 ' "[Tlhe protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is ...

the law of the individual States.'"

22

left largely to

The duty to protect the general

111. 500So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
112. Id. at 536 (quoting Justice Overton, supra note 37).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (cited by Winfield v. Division of PariMutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 1985)).
118. See, e.g., Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
119. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987)
(litigant asking court to require discovery of blood donors' identities).
120. See, e.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 1989) (state law requiring parental
notice before minor can obtain abortion).
121. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
122. Id. at 350-51 (cited in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544,
548 (Fla. 1985)). The court also noted that it "accepted that responsibility of protecting the
privacy interests of Florida citizens" in State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981). See
supra notes 6-23 and accompanying text.
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right to privacy recognized by federal and state case law, combined
with judicial hypersensitivity to an otherwise unprotected right
deemed fundamental by the court, leads the court to find a less-confining drafters' intent in the provision's broad language.
Cope' 23 and Professor Patricia Dore's'2 careful historical studies of
the history of the provision would not permit the Florida courts to
apply article I, section 23 to cases involving private-sector intrusion
into personal life. Nevertheless, key public policy concerns-the fundamental nature of the privacy right, the duty of the states to protect
that right, and the failure of the Legislature to develop law as expected by the Commission-all support a broader reading of the intent of the amendment.
The strong emphasis on public policy concerns leading to the broad
reading of intent urged by Rasmussen and Shaktman v. State'25 may
be viewed in two radically different ways. First, it may be seen as an
example of judicial activism: the courts' attempt to provide constitutional rights never intended-and in fact specifically rejected-by the
framers. Alternatively, the focus on public policy may be regarded as
a judicial attempt to clothe article I, section 23 with the powers the
drafting committee sought to provide, but was unable to press
through the Commission. In either case, such a broad reading would
allow creation of an article I, section 23 penumbra under which to
26
shield individuals against private intruders.
We have already seen that the court would have reached the same
27
end had it construed the provision according to the voters' will. If it
had done so, the court would have accomplished two goals. First, it
would have signaled the legal community that the intent of the adopting public would be honored, and that a "general right of privacy"
would be found in the privacy provision. Second, the broadened
right-being created not by judicial fiat but by traditional constitutional principles-would have stood on firmer ground.
III.

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PRIVACY RIGHTS AFFORDED BY

ARTICLE I, SECTION 23
A. Developing the Standard of Review
In his Article, Cope demonstrated that the Legislature, although it
deemed the privacy right of primary importance, left to the judiciary

123.

Cope (1978), supranote 35.

124.

Dore, supra note 34.

125.
126.

553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1989).
Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987), analyzed

infra notes 156-74 and accompanying text, provides the single example of Florida's application

of article I, § 23 in a case involving nongovernmental intrusion into private life.
127.

See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
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the duty to assign an appropriate standard of review for intrusive state
actions.' 28 Before deciding how to test the state's capacity to override
an individual right, however, the court would be required to determine the depth and scope of the protected right. These efforts were
undertaken, in part, in Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant,1 29 a case involving the question of whether the state bar could
require an applicant to reveal his history of psychological treatment.
1.

The Importance of the Right to Privacy

The two key issues in Applicant were whether the bar's requirement
constituted governmental intrusion governed by article I, section 23,
and if so, whether the amendment prohibited the intrusion. 30 The
Florida Supreme Court held that the privacy right was not unlimited,
but was governed by the circumstances of the person asserting the
right. 3 ' Essentially, although the claimant may argue a stronger right
in some scenarios, privacy may be deemed less crucial in others.
Moreover, the right may be asserted only where the individual has not
3 2
implicitly waived some or all of the protection normally afforded.
In short, a case of impermissible state intrusion into one's private life
requires not only proof that the claimant show a sufficient interest in
maintaining privacy, but a reasonable expectation of such privacy."'
Notwithstanding that Applicant's plaintiff had waived at least some
measure of his right to be let alone by applying for admission to the
Bar, the court found that the right to privacy did in some measure
exist.3 4 The court was thus required to determine whether the state's

128. Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 724-25.
129. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
130. Id. at 74.
131. Id. ("[Tihe applicant's right of privacy is circumscribed and limited by the circumstances in which he asserts that right.").
132. Id. at 74. ("By making application to the Bar, [the applicant] has assumed the burden
of demonstrating his fitness for admission into the Bar.").
133. The reasonable "expectation of privacy" test was further developed by Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (relying on Applicant). See also Shaktman
v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, .153 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring) (requiring a determination
"be made by considering all the circumstances [of the case], especially objective manifestations
of that expectation"). The test has been applied to refuse relief where no such expectation exists.
See, e.g., Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990) ("no legitimate reasonable expectation of
privacy in being able tO patronize retail establishments" for the purpose of buying obscene materials), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 288 (1991); Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So.
2d 113, 114, 119 (Fla. 1988) (holding that "all trials, civil and criminal, are public events" and
disapproving in part Sentinel Communications Co. v. Smith, 493 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 5th DCA.
1986), which held that article I, § 23 protected the right of parties to dissolution proceedings to
close court files).
134. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1983); see also id. at
77 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
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intrusion violated that limited right.' 35 Finding that the state interest
was sufficiently compelling to outweigh the petitioner's right to privacy and the means used by the state were narrowly crafted to achieve
its interest, the court upheld the state's right to require applicants to
reveal their psychological histories. 3 6 However, because the state's actions met even strict review standards, the court refused to set forth
an explicit standard of review. 3
2.

The Standard of Review

Having decided that article I, section 23 provided no blanket right

to all persons regardless of their status, and that its protection was not
135. Id. at 74.
136. Id. at 74-76.
137. Id. at 74. Sub silentio, the case provides useful guidance on related issues. On the issue
of whether article 1, § 23 protects only liberty, see Jackson, supra note 79, or both liberty and
privacy, see Cope (1978), supra note 35, Applicant for the first time allows individuals to assert a
privacy interest in personal information. On the question of whether the provision protects
against private sector invasions, the court's framing of the case is instructive: "Preliminarily, we
must determine whether the requirement that applicant answer item 28(b) and execute the authorization and release falls within the governmental intrusion [sic] as contemplated by article 1,
section 23, and, if so, we must decide whether this intrusion violates the applicant's constitutional right of privacy." Applicant, 443 So. 2d at 74.
Merely taking care to analyze the action solely under the more narrowly drawn "governmental
intrusion" plank of the provision instead of arguing that it implicated the more general "right to
be let alone" by government implies that the court would be willing to listen to private persecution claims under that clause. As to whether the Florida right encompasses those rights protected
by federal law, enlarges those rights, or protects other rights, the court recognizes two different
provinces protected by the separate rights:
We also hold that the Board's action does not violate applicant's federal constitutional
right of privacy ....
The threshold question for our analysis of that claim would be
to determine which zone of privacy applicant's asserted privacy rights fell within. If
we were to conclude they fell within the decision-making or autonomy zone of privacy
interests we would be required to apply the compelling state interest test. The privacy
interests ... are only those which are fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. These are matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing, and education. The other privacy interests
described by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . , involve one's interest in
avoiding public disclosure of personal matters. In this area, a balancing test has been
held to be the appropriate standard of review-comparing the interests served with the
interests hindered.
Id. at 76 (citations omitted).
Because Florida refused to apply a balancing test standard of review in this disclosure case, it
allowed article 1, § 23 to provide greater protection than that afforded by federal law. The supreme court later applied article I, § 23 to self-determination cases involving abortion, see In re
T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989), family relationships and child rearing, see Public Health
Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (woman had right to refuse life-saving
medical treatment despite impact on family), and medical treatment. See In re Guardianship of
Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (incompetent person had right to decline life-prolonging
treatment without which death would shortly ensue). Article I, § 23 clearly includes and expands
beyond federally-protected rights.
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absolute, the court was still faced with the duty of framing an approThe court met this task in Winfield v.
priate standard of review.'
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering.3 9 Winfield arose from an attempt
by the Florida Department of Business Regulation's Division of PariMutuel Wagering to obtain the private banking records of Malcolm
and Nigel Winfield.' 40 The Winfields gained an injunction in circuit
court on the grounds that the state's subpoenas duces tecum forced
involuntary disclosure of the records, thereby violating the plaintiffs'
rights under article 1, section 23.'41 On appeal, the Fourth District
Court reversed, but certified two questions to the high court: (1)
whether article I, section 23 prevented the state from subpoenaing a
Florida citizen's bank records without notice, and (2) whether a search
of all bank records under the facts of this case constituted an "impermissible and unbridled exercise of legislative power."' 42
In answering these questions, the court was confronted by a clear
case of state intrusion into a private area where the private individual
had not waived any of the protections normally afforded. Unlike the
petitioner in Applicant, the Winfields had not invited or acquiesced to
a state search of their files. 43 Consequently, the supreme court was
able to address the issue of whether and how a person's general right
of privacy-unaffected by any waiver-was to be treated when confronted by asserted state interests.'" Recognizing that article I, section
23 included no textual standard of review, the court relied on federal
and state case law for the proposition that the right to privacy deserved heightened scrutiny:
The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe
demands the compelling state interest standard. This test shifts the
burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The
burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged regulation
serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through
45
the use of the least intrusive means.
The Winfield test requires that the state prove its actions are motivated by a compelling state interest and are pursued by means so nar-

138. See supra text accompanying note 44.
139. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
140. Id. at 546.
141. Id.
142. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Winfield, 443 So. 2d 455, 456-57 (Fla. 4th DCA
1984).
143. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 1985).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 547 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 13 (1973)); In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So.
2d 40 (Fla. 1980)).
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rowly drawn that they violate personal rights no more than necessary
to achieve the state's interest. 1" The court also added two key qualifiers. Like Applicant, Winfield required the citizen to prove a reasonable expectation of privacy. 47 Moreover, it clarified the sweep of
article I, section 23 protection: Because the federal government gives
states the duty to protect personal rights of privacy, 4 and because the
court earlier accepted that responsibility, 49 "it can only be concluded
that the right [protected by article 1, section 23] is much broader in
scope than that of the Federal Constitution. "110
Under this reasoning, the court concluded that the Winfields had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their banking records and that
the constitution protected that interest.' 5 ' However, the state could assert a compelling state interest in gambling within state boundaries
and that it had used the least restrictive means of protecting that interest. 52 The court therefore found that the state's investigation did not
violate article I, section 23 and answered the certified questions in the
53
negative. 1
Consequently, Winfield established a two-part test. First, an individual must demonstrate that an area in which he or she had a reason54
able expectation of privacy was subjected to intrusive state action.
Second, the state must prove both that it has a compelling need to
intrude and does so by narrowly-tailored means.' This test provides
the centerpiece of Florida's article I, section 23 standard of review.
This heightened scrutiny, however, does not provide the complete regimen of tests to which state actions are exposed. Moreover, the full
panoply of such tests does not apply when the case involves privatesector infringement.
3. Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service," 6 Heightened Strict
Scrutiny in State Claims, and the Elements of Private Sector Claims
In May 1982, Donald Rasmussen was struck by an automobile
while sitting on a park bench.'57 Fourteen months after receiving fifty-

146.

Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967)).
Id. at 547-48 (citing State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981)).
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
Id. at 534.

19931

RIGHT OFPRIVACY

one pints of blood as treatment for his injuries, he was diagnosed with
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). 5 ' In a suit against
the driver for personal injuries, Rasmussen tried to identify his blood
donors to prove he had contracted AIDS from the blood transfusions
made necessary by the accident.' 59 The trial court ordered South Florida Blood Service to release the subpoenaed information. ' 6 On certiorari review, however, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
order as a violation of Florida's discovery rules.1 61 The supreme court
upheld the Third District Court, finding that the donors' rights of privacy and the public interest in maintaining a reliable blood supply
outweighed the plaintiff's interests in gaining the information. 62
The certified question of whether "the privacy interests of volunteer
blood supply donors and ... society's interest in maintaining a strong
volunteer blood donation system ' 1 63 outweighed the plaintiff's interest in discovery implicated article I, section 23 only if the provision's
protective shield extended into the private sector. Because the court
analyzed the privacy interests only as they were covered by article I,
section 23, and weighed those rights against the interests of a private
party plaintiff, 164 the privacy provision could be considered to have
been used as a shield against private sector action.
The court's decision not to undertake a compelling state interest
analysis is telling on the issues of whether and how article I, section 23
could be construed to cover private sector infringements. Winfield in65
volved a subpoena duces tecum ordered on behalf of a state agency.
Rasmussen can be distinguished as arising from an identical order requested by a private litigant."6 The result of this central difference is
that fundamentally different tests will apply in cases so distinguished.
Winfield stands for the proposition that where state action confronts

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 534-35. In applying its balancing test, the court found that although the plaintiff
had a valid interest in obtaining the subpoenaed information, the release of the data could seriously harm any number of the suspect donors. Id. at 537. Moreover, if the public doubted the
confidentiality of donor records, the volunteer blood supply might well be threatened. Id. at 53738. Faced with the prospect of "serious disincentive to volunteer blood donation," the court
concluded that discovery should be denied. Id. at 538 (quoting South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v.
Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).
163. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d at 805 n.13.
164. See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536-37 (Fla. 1987). The
court specifically weighed article I, § 23 interests without applying the compelling state interest
test required under Winfield for all contests involving state action. Id. at 535.
165. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla 1985).
166. 500 So. 2d at 534.
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the privileges protected by article 1, section 23, the intrusion must survive strict scrutiny.' 67 Rasmussen does not lower the heightened scrutiny to which state actions are exposed.'6 Rather, it opts for a
balancing test in private-sector contests, first comparing the interests
of the parties and then weighing the interests of the public at large.'69
Rasmussen would appear to vest article I, section 23 with the power
to protect against both private and public intrusion. 70 Its balancing
test may be applied in both governmental and private-sector cases. In
the former, the court will engage in strict scrutiny, but may also com-

pare the effects of state actions on third parties. 71 The decision therefore qualifies the Winfield standard of review. Instead of facing
merely a test of whether its interest is compelling and closely followed
by the intrusive action, the state may also be forced to survive a balancing test against the general public. In effect, Rasmussen creates a
two-part standard of heightened strict scrutiny in governmental action
cases: the government's need must not only outweigh the interests of
the adverse party, but also the actual or possible concerns of the public at large.
In private-sector cases, on the other hand, the court applies only the
balancing test. 72 Even against a private party, however, the courts
deem the privacy right to be fundamental. 73 Therefore, third party or
public policy concerns must prove compelling to justify violation of
the article I, section 23 cloak. 7 4 In both public and private areas,

167. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
168. 500 So. 2d at 535.
169. See id. at 535-36.
170. See id. at 536, 537 (quoting, in part, address by Justice Overton, supra note 37):
"There is a public concern about how personal information concerning an individual
citizen is used, whether it be collected by government or by business ... "
Thus, a principal aim of the constitutional provision is to afford individuals some
protection against the increasing collection, retention, and use of information relating
to all facets of an individual's life.
By the very nature of this case, disclosure of donor identities is "disclosure in a damaging context." We conclude, therefore, that the disclosure sought here implicates
constitutionally protected privacy interests.
(citations omitted). Under this reasoning, this author believes the protection afforded by article
I, § 23 is offered against all comers,
171. See, e.g., Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989)
(effect on minor children of mother's death resulting from exercise of privacy right to refuse life-.
saving blood transfusion).
172. See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987).
173. See generally id.
174. Id.
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however, the injured party must prove a reasonable expectation of
privacy before the intrusion will face the appropriate standard of review.
B. The Scope of Article I, Section 23 Protection: Where Does a
Florida Citizen Possess a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?
As a general rule, article I, section 23 grants its rights to "every
natural person."' 75 The Florida Supreme Court has construed this
76
incompetents,1 77 miterm comprehensively to include competents,
78
179
nors,
and every citizen of the state. Applicant80 and Winfield,'

however, caution that this right is not absolute. The threshold issue
for an article I, section 23 claim is whether the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 8 2 Federal privacy cases may be divided
into two classes. First are those involving the "decision-making or autonomy zone of privacy interests," those freedoms "fundamental or
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and second are those involving the "disclosure of personal matters."'8 3 However, while the
federal right to decision-making privacy is deemed fundamental, its
right to prevent forced disclosure of personal information faces only
intermediate scrutiny-a simple weighing of conflicting interests between the parties.'84
Although the Florida courts follow this classification method, 85 the
state rights are deeper and broader than their federal counterparts.
They are deeper because Floridians hold a reasonable expectation of a
175. See Cope (1978), supra note 35, at 735 (noting Constitution Revision Commission's
decision to replace proposal's "individual" with "natural person" to restrict scope of the provision to nonorganizational entities).
176. See, e.g. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989);
Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985); Florida Bd. of Bar
Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
177. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (stroke victim).
178. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) ("The right of privacy extends to
'[eJvery natural person.' Minors are natural persons in the eyes of the law and '[c]onstitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age
of majority. Minors, as well as adults . . . possess constitutional rights."') (quoting Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
179. ln re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193.
180. Applicant, 443 So. 2d at 74.
181. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
182. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
183. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 76 (Fla. 1983).
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d. 4, 10 (Fla. 1990); In re T.W.,
551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 535
(Fla. 1987).
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fundamental right to privacy in both disclosural' 6 and autonomy
cases." 7 State intrusions uniformly trigger strict scrutiny, while private-sector actions require a balancing test. 18
The scope of the right is also broader because the federal privacy
right-especially in the autonomy zone-has been strictly limited to
matters essential to the concept of ordered liberty; matters involving

"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and childrearing, and education."'8 9 While article I, section 23 has been construed to cover the same rights as those protected by federal law,19° it

has also been construed to protect a "general" right of privacy.' 9'
Thus, while it has been applied in the autonomy arena in cases involving procreation, family relationships and child-rearing, 92 it has also
been applied in a variety of other contexts.'

93

In short, Florida's citizens have a general right to expect privacy in
both the self-determination and disclosural arenas. However, the assertion of the privacy right is not absolute. It may, for example, be

186. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985)
(disclosure of financial records).
187. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984) (recognizing the right to terminate medical treatment).
188. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
189. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 76 (Fla. 1983) (citation
omitted).
190. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535-36 (Fla. 1987)
(describing the federally-protected right to privacy as "comprehensive" (citing for support Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (protecting disclosure and decision-making freedoms
and areas independently protected by the state constitution)).
191.
See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
1985):
Since the people of this state exercised their prerogative and enacted an amendment to
the Florida Constitution which expressly and succinctly provides for a strong right of
privacy not found in the United States Constitution, it can only be concluded that the
right is much broader in scope than that of the Federal Constitution.
192. See, e.g., Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
193. See, e.g., Wons, 541 So. 2d 96; John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Bludworth,
452 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1984); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
The substantive aspects of Florida's right of privacy in relation to medical treatment have been
well canvassed. See, e.g., Scott A. Frick, The Right To Forego Life-sustaining Procedures in
Florida: Is Florida "Cruzan-Proof"?, 20 STETSON L. REV. 519, 540-54 (1990) (summary of
health-law autonomy cases); Sandra G. Krawitz, Dying With Dignity in Florida-New Legislation, 64 FLA. B.j. 39 (Nov. 1990) (analysis of issues, holding, and reasoning of Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), including court-developed safeguards for
determining how a surrogate may exercise an incompetent's right to decline medical treatment);
William F. McHugh, AIDS in the Workplace: Policy, Practice, and Procedure, 18 STETSON L.
REV. 35, 55-56 (discussion of public sector employees' rights to refrain from revealing private
medical information). McHugh's study involves only state employee rights against their employer. Consequently, he follows the traditional view of article I, § 23 as a shield against state
action.
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waived by submitting to intrusion' 94 or-in autonomy cases-by publicly participating in an activity that would be protected if pursued in
private. 191

C. A Privacy Paradigm
The foregoing analysis allows this author to develop a six-part test
by which to assess potential privacy claims. Practitioners must, in the
following order, answer these questions:
(1) Whether the plaintiff may assert a reasonable expectation of pri96
vacy;1
(2) Whether the privacy interest has been invaded;' 97
(3) In governmental actions, whether the state may assert a compelling interest in the attempted intrusion,198
(4) Whether the state uses the least intrusive means of achieving its
compelling goal;199
(5) In private-sector actions, whether the opposing party's interests
outweigh the individual's right to privacy;m and
(6) In any action, whether the opposing party's interests outweigh
the public policy concerns of the right to privacy.20 1
If the first two questions are answered in the affirmative, and the
remaining applicable questions are answered in the negative, a viable
claim exists. Otherwise, the individual either has no claim, or one destined to fall before the opponent's superior and pressing rights.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution provides a textual
basis for what the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
as a fundamental, general, and broad-based right to be let alone. In
construing the privacy amendment, however, the court has read the
framers' intent with a jaundiced eye to gain a proper interpretation of

194.

See, e.g., Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983) (by

seeking admission to the Florida Bar, applicant acquiesced to investigation).
195. See Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990) (although petitioner had the right to
possess obscenity in the privacy of his home, he had no right to engage in a commercial transaction to gain access to such materials).
196. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544; Applicant, 443 So.
2d 71 (Fla. 1985).
197. See discussion of Applicant supra text accompanying notes 130-37.
198. See discussion of Winfield supra text accompanying notes 138-55.
199. See id.
200. See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987); see also
discussion of Rasmussen, supra text accompanying notes 156-74.
201. See id.
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the provision. Had the court relied on other traditional tools of constitutional construction, it could have examined the plain meaning of
the text, supplementing its analysis by considering the framers' intent
as it furthered the will of the adopting voters. Thus, the court could
have found that the fundamental right to privacy provided by article
I, section 23 protects state citizens against intrusion from any
source-government or private.
Nevertheless, the courts have sought the right end by the wrong
route. The Florida Supreme Court has broadly read the intent of the
privacy amendment, has provided numerous examples of dicta supporting a private-sector application of article I, section 23, has accepted the duty to protect the general right of privacy, and has crafted
a suitable standard of review for private-sector cases in Rasmussen.
This indicates that the supreme court might be willing-given the
right facts-to construe the privacy provision anew to make it conform to the will of the adopting public. In the alternative, the court
might follow Rasmussen and Shaktman's lead to extend article I, section 23's protection over more areas than its critics have heretofore
supposed. The Legislature's reluctance to protect its constituents'
right to be let alone in an increasingly pervasive world soon may provide such an opportunity.

